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I.  INTRODUCTION 
An artist creates a work, sells it, and lives happily ever after with a check in 
pocket—right? Or are artists afforded some rights to the quality of their work 
even after the sale? 
In July 2017, the renowned artist Cady Noland filed a lawsuit in the Southern 
District of New York seeking the destruction of Log Cabin Blank with Screw Eyes 
and Café Door (Log Cabin), a wooden sculpture formerly attributed to the artist 
that had since been disavowed by Noland and the subject of various legal 
disputes.1  Log Cabin, created by Noland in 1990, was purchased by German art 
collector Wilhelm Schürmann the same year, and was installed on view outdoors 
in 1995 at the Suermondt-Ludwig-Museum in Aachen, Germany.2  The piece, 
which was displayed outdoors for approximately ten years, was evaluated by a 
conservator in 2010; this conservator recommended that all of the logs should 
be replaced.3  As a result, “the entire edifice” of the piece was replaced, and the 
original was discarded.4  Noland was allegedly informed about the refurbishment 
of her work for the first time after the newly conserved Log Cabin was sold by 
Galerie Michael Janssen to Scott Mueller, a collector in Ohio, in July 2014.5  
Shortly after the sale, Noland faxed Mueller to disavow the piece, writing that 
the Log Cabin he had purchased was not an “artwork,” and that it had been 
repaired without her consultation and consent.6 
What might seem to be a purely symbolic gesture from Noland to signal her 
displeasure with the galleries and conservators who altered her work without 
consulting her had significant economic ramifications for all involved.  By 
disavowing her work, or refusing to have her name associated with the work, 
Noland stripped Log Cabin of its economic value.7  In addition, Noland is 
currently suing the gallery involved in the restoration of her work for violation 
of her moral rights and copyright under the Visual Artists Rights Act (VARA), a 
 
 1 Isaac Kaplan, Cady Noland Sues Seeking Destruction of Artwork “Copy” She Disavowed, 
ARTSY.NET (July 21, 2017, 12:11pm), https://www.artsy.net/article/artsy-editorial-cady-
noland-sues-collector-galleries-destroy-artwork-copy-disavowed. 
 2 Id. 
 3 Id. 
 4 Id. 
 5 Id. 
 6 Id. 
 7 Eileen Kinsella, Cady Noland Disowns $1.4 Million Log Cabin Artwork Sparking Collector 
Lawsuit, ARTNETNEWS.COM (June 25, 2015), https://news.artnet.com/market/cady-noland-
log-cabin-lawsuit-311283 (stating that Noland is “one of the most expensive living female 
artists”). 
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statute affording artists control of their work after sale or transfer of a copyright.8  
Noland’s complaint raises questions pursuant to her rights under VARA that 
have not been conclusively addressed by the courts yet, including what 
constitutes negligent restoration under VARA; what intellectual property rights 
remain after disavowal; and how conservation of art intersects with the artist’s 
copyright in her work.9  This Note will address the distinction between moral 
rights and intellectual property rights; the moral rights afforded to artists in the 
United States; the rights afforded to Noland after the sale of Log Cabin; and the 
tension between an artist’s right to the integrity of her work, and the 
responsibilities of a gallery and auction house to maintain, restore, and conserve 
the works that they hold. 
II.  BACKGROUND 
Art, literature, and other original works of authorship have traditionally 
enjoyed certain protections not afforded to standard consumer goods under a 
variety of intellectual property doctrines.10  These rights have traditionally 
included an artist’s copyright, which protects artists from those who would 
unscrupulously reproduce their work.11  Artists also enjoy a set of protections 
related to how others might exploit their work and reputation for their own 
gain.12  Moral rights aim to protect society’s interest in an artist’s ability to create 
work that reflects her vision and ethos by allowing an artist a right to put her 
name to her work and to prevent any distortion or mutilation of that work.13  
“The key concept to remember is that moral rights are not traditional property 
rights and do not purport to protect property interests. Rather, they are a separate 
set of rights, more like rights of personality or civil rights, which protect the 
artist’s unique extension of herself.”14 Moral rights may protect an artist’s 
financial interests by allowing the author to take credit for her work and thus 
profit from its sale.15  However, moral rights are not entirely economic in 
purpose.   
Moral rights seek to protect the artist’s creative process by protecting the 
artist’s control over that process and the finished work of art.  If artists feel more 
secure about the treatment they as creators and their creations will receive, they 
 
 8 Complaint, Noland v. Michael Janssen Gallery Pte., Ltd, No. 1:17-cv-05452-JPO (Filed 
07/18/17) https://www.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.nysd.477664.1.0.pdf. 
 9 See id. 
 10 Amy M. Adler, Against Moral Rights, 97 CAL. L. REV. 263, 263-264 (2009). 
 11 See 17 U.S.C. § 106. 
 12 See Susan P. Leimer, Understanding Artists’ Moral Rights: A Primer, 7 B.U. PUB. INT. L. J.  41, 
44–45 (1998). 
 13 Id. at 42. 
 14 Id. at 44–45. 
 15 See id. at 44. 
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are more likely to create.  Recognizing moral rights is one way a society can 
encourage artists to create.16 
When one buys a typical consumer good, such as a chair, he or she may 
typically do whatever she pleases with it, precluding the manufacturer from any 
sort of continued interest.17 For works that are protectable under moral rights 
laws, the rights of the artist take precedence over the property rights of the 
consumer based on idea that art transcends commerce, and that art is “connected 
to personhood, to dignity, to something that [cannot] be commodified.”18  Art 
differs from your typical consumer good because it is an extension of its creator’s 
personhood.19  To incentivize the emotional labor and vulnerability required to 
produce visual art, an author retains control over the work she has created even 
after it is sold, and the author is no longer bound in privity to the purchaser.20 
The United States enacted VARA in 1990.21  Tacked onto The Copyright Act 
of 1976, VARA was passed to bring the United States into compliance with the 
Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, which 
required member nations to, at minimum, protect the rights of integrity and 
attribution.22  VARA trains its focus onto a relatively limited class of artists, 
granting moral rights to authors of “a work of visual art.”23  To qualify for moral 
rights protection under VARA, the author must produce an original or limited 
edition painting, drawing, print, sculpture, or still photographic image. 
A painting, drawing, print, or sculpture, existing in a single copy, in a limited 
edition of 200 copies or fewer that are signed and consecutively numbered by 
the author, or in the case of a sculpture, in multiple cast, carved, or fabricated 
sculptures of 200 or fewer that are consecutively numbered by the author and 
bear the signature or other identifying mark of the author; or a still photographic 
image produced for exhibition purposes only, existing in a single copy that is 
signed by the author, or in a limited edition of 200 copies or fewer that are signed 
and consecutively numbered by the author.24 
 
 16 Id. 
 17 Adler, supra note 9, at 263. 
 18 Isaac Kaplan, How Much Control Do Artists Have over a Work after It’s sold? ARTSY.NET, (June 
21, 2016 1:22pm), https://www. Artsy.net/article/artsy-editorial-do-artists-have-the-right-to-
disown-their-work. 
 19 Leimer, supra note 12, at 43. 
 20 Adler, supra note 10, at 264. 
 21 17 U.S.C. § 106A (1990). 
 22 Leimer, supra note 12, at 46. 
 23 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a) (1990). 
 24 17 U.S.C. § 101(A). 
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Reproductions, such as a mass-produced print of a painting, are not entitled 
to the rights of integrity or attribution.25  An author of such a work is then 
granted the rights of attribution and integrity to her work for the duration of the 
author’s life.26  An artist may waive her moral rights, but may not transfer her 
moral rights to another party.27  VARA specifies that an artist’s moral rights over 
her work are distinct from her property rights; an artist who transfers her 
copyright does not waive her rights to attribution and integrity, and an artist who 
waives her moral rights does not also transfer ownership of the work or its 
copyright.28 
“The right of attribution, also known as the right of paternity, gives the artist 
the right to have her name accurately associated with her work,”29 and to prevent 
the use of her name as the author of any work that she did not create.30  In 
practice, an artist may insist that her name appear on the art and sue if his or her 
name is elided from the work.31  This right creates a “chain of title” from the 
creative process to the production of the work itself, allowing an artist to be 
credited for her work.32  This right also protects the artist’s economic interest in 
being able to sell work under her name and to build a portfolio of works 
representative of her creativity.33 
The right of integrity is directly linked to the maintenance of an artist’s 
reputation, allowing the artist to prevent her work from being distorted, 
mutilated, or modified without her permission.34  The artist maintains this right 
after she transfers ownership or copyright in the work to another party; as such, 
any new owner must consult the artist before making any changes to the work.35  
The statute distinguishes modifications of visual art as a result of: the passage of 
 
 25 See David E. Shipley, The Empty Promise of VARA: The Restrictive Application of a Narrow 
Statute, 83 MISS. L.J. 985, 1002 (2014). 
 26 17 U.S.C. § 106A(d) (1990). 
 27 Id. § 106A(e)(1). 
 28 Id. § 106A(e)(2). 
 29 Leimer, supra note 11, at 47. See also 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(1)(A) (1990) 
 30 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(1)(B) (1990). 
 31 Leimer, supra note 12, at 47–48. 
 32 Id. at 49. 
 33 See Leimer, supra note 12, at 50. 
 34 17 U.S.C. 106A(a)(3): 
[T]he author of a work of visual art . . . shall have the right 
(A) to prevent any intentional distortion, mutilation, or other modification 
of that work which would be prejudicial to his or her honor or reputation, 
and any intentional distortion, mutilation, or modification of that work is a 
violation of that right, and 
(B) to prevent any destruction of a work of recognized stature, and any 
intentional or grossly negligent destruction of that work is a violation of 
that right. 
 35 Leimer, supra note 12, at 50. 
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time, the inherent nature of the materials, and conservation or public 
presentation from impermissible modification—so long as the modification was 
not caused by gross negligence.36 
The right to integrity also encompasses the artist’s right to disassociate from 
her work when that work has been irrevocably compromised.37  An artist may 
disavow his or her work when that work is materially altered in a manner that 
the artist considers prejudicial to her reputation.38  For instance, if an auction 
house damages the pedestal of a sculptor’s work in an egregious or noticeable 
way, then that artist may demand that the work be removed from auction under 
her name.39  This disavowal can be as informal as an email or fax that demands 
disassociation from a work; no court order, process, or notice to the consignor 
or owner of the work is needed.40 
These narrow protections work in conjunction with the United States 
Copyright Act to protect an artist’s economic interest in profiting off of her 
work, and to maintain artistic integrity in the context of the artist’s brand or 
reputation.41  For the most part, the art world defers to the artist’s wishes in these 
matters, with “contracts and . . . convention” supporting artists’ rights to 
attribution and integrity.42  For instance, Cady Noland was able to disavow Log 
Cabin on the basis that it had been damaged in a way that was prejudicial to her 
reputation, despite the fact that an independent appraiser had found the work to 
be in good condition.43 
The statute suggests that courts addressing VARA claims should first embark 
upon a “three-step analysis to determine whether the artist’s” work is eligible for 
 
 36 17 U.S.C. § 106A(c)(1)(2) (1990). 
 37 Id. § 106A(a)(2): 
An author of a work of visual art shall have the right to prevent the use of 
his or her name as the author of the work of visual art in the event of a 
distortion, mutilation, or other modification of the work which would be 
prejudicial to his or her honor or reputation. 
 38 Id. 
 39 Kaplan, supra note 17. 
 40 Id. (explaining that Noland’s lawyer sent the auction house selling Noland’s work an email 
stating that “irrespective of the consignor’s wishes, Sotheby’s will withdraw ‘Cowboys Milking’ 
from auction.  The current condition of the work materially differs from that at the time of its 
creation.”); see also Kaplan, supra note 1 (recounting Noland’s fax to Mueller disavowing Log 
Cabin, writing “ ’this is not an artwork’ and noting that it was ‘repaired by a conservator [sic] 
BUT THE ARTIST WASN’T CONSULTED.’ ” (emphasis in original)). 
 41 See Leimer, supra note 11, at 44 (discussing purposes of moral rights, generally). 
 42 Kaplan, supra note 17 (quoting Amy Adler); see also Kaplan, supra note 1 (describing a 
clause in Noland’s purchase agreement with Mueller stipulating that he was entitled to reverse 
the sale should Noland disavow Log Cabin within twelve months of purchase). 
 43 Kaplan, supra note 1. 
6
Journal of Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 25, Iss. 2 [2018], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol25/iss2/5
HOEFER (COMPLETE) (DO NOT DELETE) 10/2/2018  1:46 PM 
2018] THE CURIOUS CASE OF CADY NOLAND 247 
VARA protections, and thus if “moral rights adhere in the artwork.”44  First, the 
court must determine whether the work in question is subject to copyright 
protection;45 second, the court must ascertain  “whether the work qualifies as ‘a 
work of visual art’ under the [statute’s] narrow, two-pronged definition”; and 
third, the court must ask “whether any of the statutory exceptions apply” under 
17 U.S.C. § 106A(c).46  One such relevant exception is the modification of work 
in concert with a larger conservation effort.47  VARA protects restorations and 
conservation efforts unless such efforts could be considered an exercise of gross 
negligence.48  This “gross negligence” provision has been applied  against buyers 
who have hired someone who lacks proper training in conservation to modify 
an artwork.49 
If the work meets the first two criteria, and no statutory exceptions apply, it 
is eligible for VARA protection.50  If the work is indeed eligible, “then the court 
should determine whether there is a violation of or threat to the rights of 
attribution and/or integrity, determine the extent of  damages resulting from the 
violation, and [award] appropriate equitable relief to prevent further harm to the 
artist’s reputation or the art work.”51   
Noland’s current complaint regarding the violation of her copyright and her 
right to integrity is not her first brush with litigation under VARA.  In 2011, 
Noland demanded that Sotheby’s auction house withdraw her work Cowboys 
Milking, an aluminum slab printed with images of cowboys, cabins, and a map of 
the state of Montana, from auction after inspecting the work and finding that all 
four corners of the work were damaged.52  While an inspector for the auction 
house had determined that the work was “in very good condition overall,” 
 
 44 Nathan M. Davis, Note, As Good As New: Conserving Artwork and the Destruction of Moral 
Rights, 29 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 215, 229 (2011). 
 45 Id.; See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(5) (2018). 
 46 Davis, supra note 44, at 229.  See also 17 U.S.C. § 101(2018). 
 47 17 U.S.C. § 106A(c)(1990):  
Exceptions:  
(1) The modification of a work of visual art which is a result of the passage 
of time or the inherent nature of the materials is not a distortion, mutilation, 
or other modification described in subsection (a)(3)(A). 
(2) The modification of a work of visual art which is the result of 
conservation, or of the public presentation, including lighting and 
placement, of the work is not a destruction, distortion, mutilation, or other 
modification described in subsection (a)(3) unless the modification is 
caused by gross negligence. 
 48 Id. §106A(c)(2). 
 49 See Davis, supra note 62, at 232 (discussing the possibility of selecting a sculptor for 
conservation rather than a conservator resulting in gross negligence). 
 50 Davis, supra note 45, at 229. 
 51 Id. 
 52 Kaplan, supra note 17. 
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Noland asserted  that, due to the damage to each corner of the work, Cowboys 
Milking as it stood in Sotheby’s in 2011 materially differed from the piece she 
sold in 1990.53  As auction houses have the right to withdraw a work from auction 
if doubts are raised about its authenticity, Sotheby’s pulled Noland’s piece after 
receiving an email from her lawyer stating that she considered the piece to be 
materially altered and demanding its removal.  Pre-sale appraisals estimated that 
the work would be sold from $250,000 to $350,000.54 
Following Sotheby’s decision to pull the work from auction, the consignor of 
the work, Mark Jancou, filed suit for breach of contract and tortious interference 
with contractual relations against Sotheby’s and Noland in the New York state 
court system.55  Noland and Sotheby’s both filed counterclaims and motions for 
summary judgment.56  These motions for summary judgment were granted, and 
Noland withdrew her counterclaim.57  Jancou appealed the trial court’s decision 
to grant Sotheby’s motion, but the appellate court upheld the trial court’s 
decision in a two-paragraph order.58  In the court’s estimation, Noland’s actions 
clearly fell under the rights and privileges offered to her by VARA.59 
Noland’s current case in the Southern District of New York hinges on what 
she believes to be an infringement of her copyright, in addition to a violation of 
her moral rights.60  Noland’s Log Cabin, as discussed earlier, is an edifice of a log 
cabin that was intended to be displayed outdoors.61  The gallery housing the work 
replaced pieces of wood on the façade that had begun to rot or decay over time, 
 
 53 Id.; See also 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(2) (1990). 
 54 Kaplan, supra note 17.  See also Martha Buskirk, Marc Jancou, Cady Noland, and the Case of 
Authorless Artwork, HYPERALLERGIC (Dec. 9, 2013), https://hyperallergic.com/97416/marc-
jancou-cady-noland-and-the-case-of-an-authorless-artwork/ (stating “Sotheby’s complied, 
citing a provision in their consignment agreement allowing them to withdraw a work at any 
time if, among other things, ‘there is doubt as to its authenticity or attribution’ ”). 
 55 Buskirk, supra note 41. 
 56 Id. 
 57 Id. 
 58 Tracy Zwick, Sotheby’s Wins in Dispute with Jancou Gallery Over Cady Noland Artwork, 
ARTINAMERICAMAGAZINE.COM (Aug. 29, 2013), https://www.artinamericamagazine.com/ 
news-features/news/sothebys-wins-in-dispute-with-jancou-gallery-over-cady-noland-
artwork/. 
 59 Marc Jancou Fine Art, Ltd. V. Sotheby’s, Inc., 107 A.D. 3d 637 (Ny. App. Div. 2013); see 
also 17 U.S.C § 106A(a)(2) (1990): 
[T]he author of a work of visual art shall have the right to prevent the use 
of his or her name as the author of the work of visual art in the event of a 
distortion, mutilation, or other modification of the work which would be 
prejudicial to his or her honor or reputation. 
 60 Complaint, Noland v. Galerie Michael Janssen, et al., No., 1:17-cv-05452-JPO (S.D.N.Y. 
July 18, 2017). 
 61 See supra text accompanying notes 1–4. 
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more or less preserving the work.62  According to Noland, this conservation 
work was done without her consent.63  Log Cabin was sold to Scott Mueller, an 
Ohio art collector, for $1.4 million in 2014.64  As the piece was being shipped 
from the gallery in Germany to the United States, Noland was alerted by 
Mueller’s art dealer, Brett Shaheen, to the restoration efforts that the gallery 
undertook while it housed the piece.65  Noland called Shaheen and orally 
disavowed the work.66 
After Noland disavowed Log Cabin, Mueller sued Michael Janssen and art 
advisor Marisa Newman in the Southern District of New York for the return of 
his $800,000 original transfer.67  Both Janssen and Newman filed motions to 
dismiss, each of which was granted. Mueller’s claims against Janssen were 
dismissed since they were only filed in the Southern District of New York and 
not simultaneously filed in Janssen’s native Germany, where Log Cabin had been 
displayed and restored.68  The court dismissed Mueller’s claims against Newman, 
stating that there was no breach of contract or unjust enrichment, and that 
Newman did not owe a fiduciary duty to Mueller.69 
Noland’s current suit is filed in the Southern District of New York against: 
Willhelm Schurmann, the collector who bought Log Cabin shortly after its 
creation; KOW Gallery of Berlin, which had displayed Log Cabin in a 2011 
exhibition; art advisor and dealer Chris D’Amelio; Galerie Michael Janssen; and 
Michael Janssen, who sold Log Cabin to Mueller.70  Noland alleges “some, if not 
all, members of this group were involved in the decision to refabricate the work 
in 2010.”71 
 
 62 Kinsella, supra note 7 (describing a condition report prepared by the gallery 
recommending that “the only way to ensure the long-term viability/existence of the artwork 
would be to replace the rotting logs with new ones”). 
 63 See Complaint, Noland v. Galerie Michael Janssen, et al., No. 1:17-cv-05452-JPO 
(S.D.N.Y. July 18, 2017). 
 64 Eileen Kinsella, Judge Throws Out Lawsuit Over $1.4 Million Cady Noland Artwork After Artist 
Disavows It, ARTNETNEWS.COM (Dec. 13, 2016), https://news.artnet.com/art-world/judge-
dismisses-cady-noland-lawsuit-782264. 
 65 Id. 
 66 Id. (stating that Noland informed Shaheen that “any effort to display or sell the sculpture 
must include notice that the piece was remade without the artist’s consent, that it now consists 
of unoriginal materials, and that she does not approve of the work”). 
 67 Id. 
 68 Id. 
 69 Id. 
 70 Complaint, Noland v. Galerie Michael Janssen, et al., No. 1:17-cv-05452-JPO (S.D.N.Y. 
July 18, 2017). 
 71 Julia Halperin & Eileen Kinsella, Cady Noland Sues Three Galleries for Copyright Infringement 
Over Disavowed Log Cabin Sculpture, ARTNET (July 21, 2017), https://news.artnet.com/art-
world/cady-noland-copyright-infringement-log-cabin-1030649. 
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Noland’s claim has two main prongs.  The first is that the defendants violated 
her moral rights under VARA when they negligently restored her work without 
her consent.72  Specifically, Noland stated that “the collector who loaned Log 
Cabin to a German museum was ‘either negligent or indifferent to the work’ and 
‘failed . . . to protect the work from rot, deterioration and exposure to the 
elements.’ “73 
The second prong of Noland’s lawsuit alleges that the defendants infringed 
her copyright by hiring a conservator to repair Log Cabin without consulting 
her.74  In essence, the lawsuit suggests that “by discarding the rotting logs and 
wooden elements that made up the cabin’s facade and replacing them with new 
ones, the conservator essentially destroyed the original work and created an 
unauthorized reproduction.”75  Noland’s attorney went so far as to state “[w]ood 
can be restored, even rotting wood,” but that this restoration effort was “a 
forgery.”76 
At the time of writing, Noland has filed a Second Amended Complaint, 
Janssen has filed a Motion to Dismiss Noland’s Second Amended Complain, and 
his co-defendants have filed memoranda in support.77  Noland has filed a 
Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss her 
Second Amended Complaint.78 
III.  ANALYSIS 
Since VARA’s enactment, very few cases involving the statute and its 
application have been litigated;79 as such, many of the more attenuated claims 
 
 72 Id.; 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a) (1990): 
[T]he author of a work of visual art . . . (3) . . . shall have the right - (A) to 
prevent any intentional distortion, mutilation, or other modification of that 
work which would be prejudicial to his or her honor or reputation, and any 
intentional distortion, mutilation, or modification of that work is a violation 
of that right, and (B) to prevent any destruction of a work of recognized 
stature, and any intentional or grossly negligent destruction of that work is 
a violation of that right. 
 73 Halperin, supra note 56; see also Complaint, Noland v. Galerie Michael Janssen, et al., No. 
1:17-CV-05452-JPO (S.D.N.Y. July 18, 2017). 
 74 Complaint at 8, Noland v. Galerie Michael Jannsen, et al. No. 1:17-CV-05452-JPO 
(S.D.N.Y. July 18, 2017). 
 75 Halperin, supra note 56. 
 76 Id. (quoting Andrew Epstein). 
 77 Noland v. Galerie Michael Janssen, et al., No. 1:17-CV-05453-JPO (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 17, 
2018). 
 78 Id. 
 79 Nathan M. Davis, Note, As Good As New: Conserving Artwork and the Destruction of Moral 
Rights, 29 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 215, 229 (2011). 
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that Noland puts forth in her complaint are relatively novel.  In particular, 
Noland’s copyright claim regarding the reconstruction of her work has never 
been conclusively addressed in a court of law.80 Despite the novelty of her claim 
that the conservation of her work was a violation of copyright, Noland has 
standing to bring claims against the gallery and the other defendants under 
VARA because the work in question is a sculpture, made in a single copy, and 
was not made for hire.81  As an author of a visual work of art, Noland has the 
right to claim attribution and integrity in her work.82   
Noland alleges that the gallery housing her work  was negligent in its failure 
to prevent the wood from decaying in its time at the gallery, and that this failure 
resulted in the distortion of her work such that their actions violated her moral 
rights.83 However, there is no specific allegation of a negligent conservation 
effort by the parties.84 
As such, Noland’s case falls outside of the ambit of the typical negligent 
conservation claim, because, while the damage to her reputation directly stems 
from a conservation effort, she does not claim that the conservation itself was 
negligent. For example, in Flack v. Friends of Queen Catherine Inc., the Southern 
District of New York denied a motion to dismiss an artist’s VARA claims 
involving the re-sculpting of a clay model of a commissioned brass sculpture, 
where the re-sculpting was done by an “assistant” untrained in conservation.85 
Though the parties eventually settled, the court indicated that it would at least 
entertain the notion that the skill level of the conservationist matters, and that 
those who alter a protected work are subject to a certain standard of care.86 
Even setting aside cases like  Flack , Noland’s moral rights claim is not likely 
to succeed because VARA provides that  “[t]he modification of a work of visual 
art which is a result of the passage of time or the inherent nature of the materials 
is not a distortion, mutilation, or other modification described in subsection 
(a)(3)(A).”87  The statute does not consider the placement of a work of visual art 
that is distasteful to the artist or prejudicial to their reputation a violation of the 
artist’s moral rights, so Noland would be unlikely to succeed upon an argument 
centered upon her opposition to the work’s display outdoors.88  Wood can decay 
or otherwise change in appearance upon exposure to the elements, and as 
 
 80 Id. at 230–32 (citing Flack v. Friends of Queen Catherine, Inc., 139 F. Supp. 2d 526 (S.D.N.Y. 
2001). 
 81 17 U.S.C. § 101(A)(1990). 
 82 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(1)–(2)(1990). 
 83 Complaint at 2-3, Noland v. Galerie Michael Janssen, et al., No. 1:17-CV-05453-JPO 
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 17, 2018). 
 84 Id. 
 85 Flack v. Friends of Queen Catherine Inc., 139 F. Supp. 2d 526, 535 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). 
 86 Id. 
 87 17 U.S.C. § 106A(c)(1) (1990). 
 88 See id. § 106A(c)(2). 
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Noland cannot claim that the placement of a work violates her rights to 
attribution or integrity, she is unlikely to succeed on the merits of a moral rights 
claim concerning the damage done to her work while it was displayed.89   
Noland’s claims regarding the infringement of her copyright also raise 
interesting questions about the intersection of moral rights, copyright, and 
conservation.  VARA was enacted under the wider umbrella of the United States 
Copyright Act, but the rights afforded to authors of visual art are distinct from 
the rights afforded copyright holders generally.90  17 U.S.C. §§ 106A(b) and 
106A(e)(2) both distinguish moral rights from copyright.  Specifically, the statute 
states that only the author of a visual work may lay claim to moral rights in that 
work, regardless of whether or not the author is the copyright holder.91  Further, 
the statute distinguishes between transfer of copyright and transfer of moral 
rights, stating that an artist’s transfer of ownership or copyright in an artwork to 
another party does not constitute a transfer of his or her moral rights under the 
statute, and that the reverse applies.92  Absent a written waiver of copyright or 
other property rights, the waiver of an artist’s moral rights does not constitute a 
waiver of such.93 The statute does not specify whether or not an artist’s copyright 
or property rights change when she invokes her moral rights within the context 
of the distortion, mutilation, modification, or destruction of the work. 
While Noland’s copyright claim is somewhat novel, as her work was more or 
less reproduced onto itself during the conservation efforts, it has a higher 
 
 89 The statute is silent on the necessity of consent for alterations or conservation done to 
an artist’s work. Thus, any speculation as to the success of a VARA claim under a theory that 
failing to obtain consent could be considered under the gross negligence exception to 17 
U.S.C. § 106A(c)(2) is beyond the scope of this paper. 
 90 Id. § 106A(a): “Subject to section 107 and independent of the exclusive rights provided 
in section 106, the author of a work of visual art . . . .” 
 91 Id. § 106A(b):  
“Only the author of a work of visual art has the rights conferred by 
subsection (a) in that work, whether or not the author is the copyright 
owner. The authors of a joint work of visual art are coowners [sic] of the 
rights conferred by subsection (a) in that work.” 
 92 Id. 
 93 Id. § 106A(e)(2): 
Ownership of the rights conferred by subsection (a) with respect to a work 
of visual art is distinct from ownership of any copy of that work, or of a 
copyright or any exclusive right under a copyright in that work.  Transfer 
of ownership of any copy of a work of visual art, or of a copyright or any 
exclusive right under a copyright, shall not constitute a waiver of the rights 
conferred by subsection (a).  Except as may otherwise be agreed by the 
author in a written instrument signed by the author, a waiver of the rights 
conferred by subsection (a) with respect to a work of visual art shall not 
constitute a transfer or ownership of any copy of that work, or of ownership 
of a copyright or of any exclusive right under a copyright in that work. 
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likelihood of success than her VARA claims.  Authors are afforded the exclusive 
right to reproduce a copyrighted work in copies, to prepare derivative works 
based upon the copyrighted work, and to display the work publicly.94  A finder 
of fact could certainly term the restoration as an unauthorized reproduction, as 
the restoration allegedly involved replacing all of the original wooden 
components of the work without Noland’s consultation.95  When addressing the 
sculptor’s copyright claims in Flack, for example, the court found that the 
conservator impermissibly copied the artist’s work when he attempted to restore 
and rebuild a clay mold that the artist had built to later be cast in bronze.96  The 
artist successfully claimed that the conservator’s “rebuilding of the clay face by 
using pictures of the original constituted the infringing creation of a derivative 
work or reproduction,” despite the defendants’ arguments that the reproduction 
was authorized in a prior agreement that permitted the defendants to make 
smaller models of the artist’s work.97  Finding no such implied authorization for 
the conservator to copy Flack’s original work, the court found that the contract 
did not create a license for the conservator to create a modified sculpture, which 
would be otherwise violative of Flack’s copyright rights.98 
Noland alleges that she was not made aware of the damage that Log Cabin 
had sustained or the conservation efforts that the gallery undertook to save the 
structure until after all of the original wooden components had been replaced 
and discarded.99  Under the statute and the court’s interpretation of similar facts 
in Flack, Noland’s claim that the various parties violated her copyright will likely 
survive a motion to dismiss. 
While it seems counterintuitive that Noland might retain copyright over her 
work after disavowing it, the statute clearly states that intellectual property rights 
and moral rights are two different animals.100  Thus, while Noland is no longer 
the artist behind Log Cabin, she could successfully seek and claim damages from 
the defendants for the copyright to her former work, regardless of whether she 
refuses to claim Log Cabin as such. 
 
 
 94 Id. §§ 106(1)–(6). 
 95 Complaint at 5, Noland v. Galerie Michael Janssen, et al., No. 1:17-CV-05453-JPO 
(S.D.N.Y. July 18, 2017). 
 96 Flack v. Friends of Queen Catherine Inc., 139 F. Supp. 2d 526, 536–37 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). 
 97 Id. at 536. 
 98 Id. at 537. 
 99 Complaint at 7-9, Noland v. Galerie Michael Janssen, et al., No. 1:17-CV-05453-JPO 
(S.D.N.Y. July 18, 2017). 
 100 17 U.S.C. § 106A(b). 
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IV.  CONCLUSION 
At the time of this writing, the fate of Cady Noland, the defendants charged 
in her complaint, and the moral and intellectual property rights over Log Cabin 
are yet to be determined.  Should this case follow in the footsteps of many VARA 
cases, it will likely be dismissed or settle before the court can conclusively state 
how attorneys should interpret the VARA in connection with consent, 
conservation, and copyright.  While one should rarely wish for drawn-out 
litigation on other persons, perhaps the curious case of Cady Noland and the 
new Log Cabin will be the judiciary’s opportunity to delineate firmer conservation, 
integrity, and copyright principles. 
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